Abstract. In this paper we present a new class of attacks against RSA with low encrypting exponent. The attacks enable the recovery of plaintext messages from their ciphertexts and a known polynomial relationship among the messages, provided that the ciphertexts were created using the same RSA public key with low encrypting exponent.
Introduction
In this paper we present a new class of attacks against RSA [8] with low encrypting exponent. The attacks enable the recovery of plaintext messages from their ciphertexts and a known polynomial relationship among the messages, provided that the ciphertexts were created using the same RSA public key with low encrypting exponent. Our attacks differ from the low-exponent attacks described by Moore [6] and Hastad [5] and the common modulus atlack identified by Sinimons [lo] , which pertain only to ciphertexts encrypted under dzfferent public keys.
Given encryptions of k messages under the same RSA public key with exponent e l together with knowledge of a polynomial relation of degree 6 among the messages, the goal of the attacks is to recover all messages. Our results were influenced by an attack presented by Franklin and Reiter [4] for the case k = 2, e = 3, S = 1. Starting with this case, we generalize the exponent e in Section 2, the degree S in Section 3, and the number of messages k in Section 4.
Implications of the attack are considered in Section 5 .
Generalizing t h e exponent e
Suppose we have two messages ml and m 2 related by a known affine relation Suppose further that the messages are encrypted under RSA with an exponent of 3 using a single public modulus N .
Then from c1, c2, a ! P, N we can calculate the secret messages mi algebraically as follows:
The algebra is more transparent if we assume (without loss of generality) that a = p = 1 .
(1)
--So if the RSA exponent is e = 3 and we have k = 2 messages, satisfying a known polynomial relation of degree 6 = 1, we can recover the messages mi algebraically from the ciphertexts and the coefficients of the polynomial relation.
When e = 5 , setting c1 = m5 mod N and c2 = (rn + 1)5 mod N , we can find For an arbitrary exponent e in the case of Ic = 2 messages subject to a linear relation, it will always be possible to write down an equation analogous to (1) . Specifically, there will exist polynomials P(m) and Q(m) such that each can be expressed as rational polynomials in me and ( m + l ) e , and such that Q ( m ) = mP(m). Already for e = 5, however, this is fairly complicated. As e grows, this explicit expression of rn as a ratio of two polynomials in c1 and c2 requires O(e2) coefficients, and it is not immediately obvious how to calculate these coefficients efficiently.
Fortunately there is an easier method. Let z denote the unknown message m. Then z satisfies the following two polynomial relations:
where the ci are treated as known constants. Apply the Euclidean algorithm to find the greatest common divisor of these two univariate polynomials over the ring Z / N :
This should yield the linear polynomial z -m (except possibly in rare cases').
We do not fully understand the cases m = (1 -w ' ) / ( w -1) E Z I P , 2 
where p is a prime factor of N and w is a primitive eth root of 1 in some extension of Z/p. This condition seems to imply that elp -1, in contradiction to the RSA requirement gcd(e,p -1) = 1, but work needs to be done to verify this. Other than these at most ( e -l)(e -2) possible exceptions, the gcd will in fact be linear.
The attack applies for any value of e l but is limited by the cost of computing the gcd of two polynomials of degree e. A straightforward implementation of Euclid's algorithm takes O(e2) operations in the ring Z / N . More sophisticated techniques can be used t o compute the gcd in O(e log' e) time [la] . Using these methods, the attack may be practical for all exponents of length up to around 32 bits. For example, the attack will be very efficient against e = 2"+ 1, a popular choice in many applications.
Generalizing the degree 5 of the polynomial
One generalization is immediate. Suppose we have two messages m l , niz satisfying a known polynomial relation of the form
and we know p and the two ciphertexts c ; . Then as before, the two equations
are both satisfied by z = ml mod N so that will be divisible by t -m l , and except in rare cases we will have gcd(ze -~1 ,
(One of the exceptional cases, in which this procedure fails, is when p(t) is of the form p ( z ) = z h q ( z e ) , because then the ciphertext c2 is easily derived from the ciphertext c1 , namely
and we gain no new information.)
What if ml and m2 satisfy an implicit polynomial relation?
In this case we have three polynomials relating two unknowns m o d N :
Now we need another algebraic tool: the resultant. The two operations, resultant and gcd, can be combined under the general heading of "Groebner basis." Indeed, fixing the coefficients of p and the ciphertexts c; as constants, and computing the Grvebrier basis of P l ( x l y), Pz(r), P,(y), as polynomials over Z / N , will generally produce the result [(z -m l ) , (y -r n z ) ] . In this paper, however, we work explicitly with the resiiltlantj and gcd, in order to better estimate t,he complexity of the attacks.
4 Generalizing the number of messages E
4.1
Suppose we have k messages ml. . . . , mk, related by a polynoi-nialp(rnl,. . . , m k ) , and that, W P know thc ciphertexts c, = mi mod N and the coefficients of the polynomial p . As before, substitute variables x , for the unknown messages niz, and obtain the k + 1 polynomials Arbitrary polynomial relationship among messages Then evaluating gCd(Qk-I(Zk), P k ( . k 1)
we hope to find the linear polynomial (zk -m k ) , from which we discover n z k .
Finally, repeatedly back substitute: Qi-l(2i,mi+l,mi+2,. ..,mk)) = (xi -mi),
as i goes from k -1 to 1, to find all the messages mi. The complexity of this general attack is dominated by the computation of the resultants &I,. . . , Q k -l . Each Q, is a polynomial of total degree ei6, in k -i
variables. The number of monomial terms in each Q, is potentially as large as @(6k/2ek22/4). Thus, this attack may require 6°(k'e0(k2) operations over Z I N .
4.2
As will be seen in Section 5.2, a special case of interest is that, in which Po = p is linear, say with w some known constant. The special form of p allows us to make the computations more efficient. In addition, the success of the attack differs depending on whether w is zero or nonzero. 
Both Rh(Yh) and Sh(yh) are univariate polynomials in yh. Their gcd will hopefully be the linear polynomial and we can proceed from there by divide-and-conquer.
A shortcut to computing each Ri(yi) is to evaluate Ri-l(yi -xi) by Homer's rule, replacing each occurrence of xi" by ci. The complexity of the attack is dominated by the complexity of computing gCd(Rh(yh), Sh(Yh)). This is O(ek/'k2) since the degrees of Rh and s h are both @ ( e k i 2 ) .
Homogeneous case. A difficulty arises in the homogeneous case w = 0. Because Po is homogeneous, and all the other polynomials are of thc form z ec, given any solution ( x i , z 2 , . . . , zk) and any eth root of unity 4, the tuple (4x1, 4 x 2 , . . . , q!mk) is also a solution of all the Pi. Thus the attacker cannot solve for the individual xi; the most it can hope for is t o be able to solve for all homogeneous polynomials of degree e in the zi. In particular, when the attacker attempts to compute yh, the gcd yields at best something like rather than the desired linear polynomial. This is an inherent difficulty in our approach, and has a bearing on the application described in Section 5.2.
However, there are occasions when the attack succeeds even in the homogeneous case. For example, suppose where X I , X2, A3 are known, while m , ,i 3 are unknown, and e = 3. Further suppose that, /7 is known to satisfy p3 < N . This is a homogeneous case, because the three plaintexts are known to satisfy the linear relation From the three ciphertexts ci = ms mod N and the three coefficients X i , A2, A 3 , it is possible to solve for B = P3 mod N : e.g., B -,B3 = gcd(f, g), where
Then /7 can be recovered by computing the real cube root of B (i.e., without modular reduction), from which m can be recovered using previous techniques.
Implications
Due to the widespread popularity of RSA with low encrypting exponent, our attacks potentially have implications to the security of a wide range of current and future cryptographic protocols. In this section we show how our attacks reveal vulnerabilities in two protocols.
The TMN protocol
In [13], Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki and Newman proposed a key distribution protocol. In this protocol, a passive eavesdropper sees rp mod N , r5 mod N , and r1 + 7-2 mod N exchanged among the protocol participants, where e = 3 and 7-1, T:, are randomly generated values. The techniques of the previous sections enable a passive eavesdropper to learn the shared session key 7-2 distributed in the protocol.
Simmons [ll] previously found an active attack on this scheme (requiring two conspirators), for which three counter measures were suggested in [13] . The first two countermeasures-incorporating structure into r1 and r 2 , and prepending timestamps to 7-1 and 7-2-do not prevent our passive attack. The third, which assumes a shared secret key between the server and each party, appears to withstand our attack. Park et. al. [7] exploited the use of e = 3 in TMN to show that after the same two parties exchange a session key three times, each has enough information to impersonate the other in future protocol executions. In contrast, our attack enables any eavesdropper t o recover the session key exchanged in any run of the protocol. Nevertheless, our attack does not immediately apply to the fix proposed in [7].
Verifiable signature sharing
In [3], Franklin and Reiter presented a scheme to efficiently share an RSA signature of a known message among R 2 51 + 1 servers so that the servers could verify the signature relation, despite the malicious misbehavior of up t o t of the servers. As part of this protocol, the holder of the signature shares the signature using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [9], i.e., by choosing a t random a univariate polynomial t j =O over Z / N such that bo is the secret signature, and privately sending the share B(i) to the i-th server for 1 5 i 5 R. The intention is to ensure that a subset of t + 1 servers can use their shares to recover B (by Lagrange interpolation), but to prevent t or fewer malicious servers from doing so. However, the holder of the signature also publishes the RSA encryption of each share under the same RSA public key with exponent e = 3 , i.e., { B ( i ) e mod N}l<i<,. --k j = 1
Conclusion
We have identified a new class attacks against RSA with low encrypting exponent, which exploit known polynomial relationships among the encrypted messages. This can lead to weaknesses in protocols for which such relationships can be inferred. When the relationships are essential to the correctness of a protocol, as in the case of Section 5.2, the only repair seems to be increasing the size of the encrypting exponent. If the polynomial relationships are not essential, then another repair might be to transform the plaintexts so that those relationships no longer hold. Possible transformations are applying a public permutation, such as DES with a fixed key, or padding the plaintext with random bits (though this may not always suffice; see [a] ). Such transformations are discussed, e.g., in [l] .
